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This article is concerned with the function of English judges in employing the 
doctrine of public policy to decide cases under common law. For the first time, 
the article offers a critical appraisal of the recent evolution of public policy and 
decision making under English law from a structured doctrine of legal rules 
and limited judicial discretion to an open-ended principle of subjective 
evaluations. The main thesis of the article is that the latest judicial amendment 
of the nature of the public policy inquiry constitutes a radical and unnecessary 
departure from generally accepted propositions on the appropriate function of 




This article is concerned with the function of English judges in employing the 
doctrine of public policy to decide cases under common law. It is now widely 
accepted that judicial function and decision making operates within a 
framework of bounded discretion. 1  While national legal systems have 
developed sophisticated bodies of precedent to guide judicial function and 
decision making,2 a number of empirical studies have shown that the way 
judges evaluate facts and construe legal rules is influenced, at times 
considerably, by a wide range of extra-legal factors, including surrounding 
social, economic and political circumstances as well as personal values.3 When 
judges have a choice of various possible legal outcomes, which are all 
consonant with the law, they tend to choose the legal outcome which is more 
																																																								
*Stavros Brekoulakis is a Professor in International Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, Queen Mary University of London and an associated member of 3 Verulam Buildings.  
1 Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1974) 88 Harv L Rev 1057; Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the 
Formalistic-Realist Divide (Princeton 2010). 
2  Harry T Edwards and Michael A Livermore, “Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking” (2009) 58 Duke LJ 1895. 
3 See the classic study of John Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (5th ed, Fontana 1996), and 
more recently Rachel Cahill-O’Callaghan, “The Influence of Personal Values on Legal 
Judgments” (2013) 40(4) Journal of Law and Society 596; and in the US, the classic attitudinal 
studies of Jeffrey Segal and Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (CUP 
1993) and The Supreme Court and The Attitudinal Model Revisited (CUP 2002). 
	 2	
compatible with their personal views or the views of society, as they 
understand them.4    
 
However, while judicial discretion in evaluating facts and interpreting the law 
is generally accepted, the question of whether judicial creativity can entail 
judges modifying existing legal rules or introducing new legal rules is more 
complex and indeed contested not least because it tends to blur the 
demarcation line between judiciary and legislature.5  
 
The debate about the appropriate limits of judicial function is most 
interestingly connected with the debate surrounding the concept of public 
policy. Is public policy a general principle of an open-ended nature or a set of 
legal rules identified with the policy of the law? Judicial function will differ 
considerably under these two diverse jurisprudential accounts of public policy. 
If public policy operates as an open-ended general principle, judges will have 
discretion to introduce new heads of public policy, which would allow them to 
decide questions on political expediency. By contrast, if public policy functions 
as a set of legal rules, judges will only be allowed to ascertain the content of 
existing public policies as these are enshrined in statutes and the common law.  
 
Despite its theoretical and practical significance, the debate about public policy 
and judicial function appears to have escaped the focus of modern legal 
discourse both in England and internationally. Relatively few studies on this 
topic exist, and these mostly date back to the beginning or the middle of the 
twentieth century.6 By contrast, contemporary scholarship tends to focus on the 
content of public policy rules in certain fields of law, mainly international 
arbitration and private international law.7 
 
Yet, as the recent decision of the UK Supreme Court (SC) in Patel v Mirza [2016] 
shows,8 the question of whether judges can employ public policy to introduce 
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new rules on the basis of the interests of the public at large is as important as 
ever. As is explained in detail below, the majority SC ruling in Mirza 
substituted the public policy rule on illegality (ex turpi causa), which stretched 
back to the eighteenth century authority of Holman v Johnson,9 with a broader 
inquiry as to whether enforcement of a claim would be harmful to the public 
interest. As the majority in Mirza held, this broader inquiry should be decided 
on the basis of a range of factors and policies competing with the public policy 
prohibiting illegality.  
 
Until now, existing commentary on Mirza has focused on the impact of the 
decision on the illegality rule, leaving unexplored the broader and important 
questions on public policy and judicial function.10 For the first time, the article 
offers a critical appraisal of the recent evolution of public policy under English 
law from a structured doctrine of legal rules and limited judicial discretion to 
an open-ended principle of subjective evaluations. The main thesis of the article 
is that the latest judicial amendment of the nature of the public policy inquiry 
constitutes a radical and unnecessary departure from generally accepted 
propositions on the appropriate function of English judges in addressing issues 
of public policy. 
 
The article is divided into two parts. The first part takes a historical and 
doctrinal approach looking into how the doctrine of public policy has 
developed since its inception and in particular in the last two centuries. As the 
analysis shows, since the beginning of the twentieth century in particular, the 
concept of public policy in English law evolved away from the generalisations 
of the earlier years into a structured doctrine of legal rules which accorded 
English judges limited discretion to ascertain what is good for the public at 
large. Under this modern version of the public policy doctrine, English judges 
could refuse enforcement of a claim as being against public policy only if the 
claim violated policies which were crystallised into statutory or common law. 
An English judge had no discretion to introduce a new rule of public policy on 
the basis of what the judge believed would benefit the public interest or on the 
basis of considerations of justice. While the modern doctrine of public policy 
was accused of being too rigid occasionally leading to harsh results, it seemed 
consistent with the general approach of English law which generally allows 
little room for value judgements. 
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The second part discusses the radical evolution of the doctrine of public policy 
in the wake of the UK Supreme Court decision in Mirza. As is suggested, the 
range-of-factors approach currently favoured by English law invites English 
judges to engage in open-ended and highly subjective evaluations without the 
benefit of a guiding public policy test or standard. This approach to decision 
making, which is akin to unfettered discretion, allows English judges to 
introduce new rules on public policy on the basis of what they believe would 
benefit the public interest or on the basis of considerations of justice, and as 
such, runs contrary to the way they have traditionally been exercising their 
judicial function.   
 
Examining judicial function within the limits of the public policy doctrine in 
England is an important dispute resolution question which matters not only 
for English  law but also for the field of international arbitration. English law is 
the most popular choice of law in international contracts,11 and the English 
doctrine of public policy has been the subject of a number of important 
decisions in international arbitration, including in investment arbitration.12 The 
question of what is the appropriate scope and nature of judicial function under 
English  law and public policy can have significant implications on the 
appropriate limits of arbitrators’ decision making in issuing international 
arbitral awards.   
 
2. Historical development of the concept of public policy in English law 
The inquiry into public policy brings us directly into the centre of a broader 
debate implicating judicial function and decision making.13 In this connection, 
two conflicting accounts of public policy have been offered.  
 
One school of thought posits that English judges cannot introduce new heads 
of public policy because judicial function is constrained by strict rules of legal 
precedent.14 While judicial function tends to be influenced by evolving social 
and economic circumstances when judges are called to identify the content of 
public policy rules, the rules of public policy effectively remain the same, 
unless the legislator intervenes. On this view, English judges are bound by 
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previous rulings on public policy in the same way that they are bound by legal 
precedent in other fields of the common law.  
 
Another school of thought supports the view that public policy cannot be 
viewed as a set of fixed rules. Judges, it is argued, should enjoy discretion in 
determining what is good for the public welfare and, if necessary, should be 
able to introduce new rules of public policy to address complex legal issues that 
exist in  modern society. 15  According to this view, judicial discretion in 
determining the content of public policy is not to be confused with law reform; 
rather, it is the recognition that legal rules are built upon certain implicit moral 
and social assumptions which may fundamentally change in the course of 
time.16 
  
To provide a contemporary account of the doctrine of public policy in English 
law and illustrate the way English judges function in deciding questions 
involving public policy it is instructive to first look into the historical 
development of the doctrine, whose conceptual origins may be traced back 
many centuries. 
 
i. Early modern period 
Public policy’s antecedents can be found as early as in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries17 when English courts refused to enforce certain conditions 
on the basis that they were “encounter common ley” (“against the common 
law”),18 or “encounter le necessity del commonwealth” (“against the needs of the 
commonwealth”)19 or “encounter de ley de Dieu” (“against the law of God”).20 
Winfield in his seminal study on the subject noted that the concept of public 
policy was unconsciously or half-consciously pervading, albeit under several 
different names, the whole English legal system at a time when little statutory 
or common law existed and the majority of cases would often raise new legal 
matters for English judges. In those times, when English judges laid down a 
new rule or moderated existing rules that were harsh, they did it solely for the 
benefit of the public.21 Even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the 
concept of public policy was concealed under widely abstract terms that 
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allowed judges to fill gaps in the law on the basis of what was considered to be 
good for the community.22 
 
The concept of public policy started to acquire more precise meaning and 
technical shape much later. In the eighteenth century, statutory law and case 
law become denser and tended to cover more ground in English law, which 
was previously occupied by abstract legal concepts, such as reason, 
convenience and policy. As a result, public policy ceased to pervade English 
law as a whole and eventually shrank to certain legal fields, 23  such as 
agreements in restraint of law, 24  the rule against perpetuities, 25  contracts 
tainted by fraud and marriage contracts.26  
 
However, while it lost its all-pervasive nature, public policy in the eighteenth 
century remained an open-ended concept that was largely considered as a valid 
basis of judicial legislation.27 So wide was the range of discretion accorded to 
English judges of the time that they had authority to invalidate a contract, 
which was otherwise not prohibited by law or legal precedent, if they 
considered the contract to be against principles of morality or policy. 
 
For example, in Jones v Randall (1774),28 an action was brought for the recovery 
of money won upon a wager. Lord Mansfield stated that while a contract such 
as a wager was prohibited neither by statute nor by precedent, it could be 
rendered unenforceable if it was against certain principles, such as “principles 
of morality” or “principles of sound policy”.29 He noted that common law 
would be a “strange science” if it was decided upon precedents only; rather, he 
was of the view that English law depended upon principles which run 
“through all the cases according as the particular circumstances of each have 
been found to fall within the one or other of them”.30  
 
Such an open-ended approach brought public policy very close to political 
expediency. In The Earl of Chesterfield v Sir Abraham Janssen,31 Lord Hardwick 
LC regarded the concept of “publick utility” as including “political arguments 
in the fullest sense of the word” which must be given “great weight in the 
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consideration” of the court because they concern the good government of a 
nation.32 
 
ii. The nineteenth century 
However, as English statutory and case law further evolved in the nineteenth 
century, giving clear shape to legal principles and laying down legal rules, the 
account of public policy as a source of judicial legislation was about to be 
challenged. This was a period during which judges started, albeit with some 
exceptions,33 to look at public policy in more critical terms, beginning to realise 
that the wide scope and fluid nature of the doctrine had to be constrained 
“unless it was to thrust them into a position which Parliament alone could 
occupy, or to infect with a virus of uncertainty principles which had long been 
settled by case law”.34 It is no coincidence that the famous reference to public 
policy as an “unruly horse” was made at that time in Richardson v Mellish, 35 
where the English court refused to hold an agreement, whereby the plaintiff 
would resign the command of a ship in favour of the defendant’s nephew upon 
receiving in exchange the command of another ship, as against public policy. 
Mr Justice Burrough aptly articulated a general feeling of unease among the 
majority of judges of the time that the doctrine of public policy as a general 
principle of law had the potential to disturb the delicate balance of powers 
between the judiciary and “that high tribunal, namely the legislature” which 
alone has the authority and the means of bringing before it all relevant, legal as 
well as non-legal, considerations to decide complex questions of policy.36  
 
Against this background of judicial disquiet towards public policy, the 
outcome of the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Egerton v 
Brownlow,37 in the middle of the nineteenth century, came as a surprise. In his 
will, the Earl of Bridgewater had devised extensive real estate in favour of Lord 
Alford with the condition that if he died without having acquired the title of 
Duke or Marquis of Bridgewater, the gift would be void. While the legal issue 
was whether the condition should be enforced or not, the broader and more 
important question in Egerton concerned the nature of public policy and the 
appropriate boundaries of judicial function. The judges were summoned by the 
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House of Lords to give their views. The vast majority of them opined that 
public policy was the policy of the law only. They noted that an activity or a 
contract would be illegal as against public policy only when it would be 
contrary to the principle established by statutory law or precedent, rather than 
when it would be considered inexpedient by the judges. Baron Parke expressed 
this view forcefully, observing:  
 
Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead 
to uncertainty and error, when applied to the decision of legal rights. It 
is the province of the statesman, and not the lawyer, to discuss, and of 
the Legislature to determine, what is best for the public good, and to 
provide for it by proper enactments. It is the province of the judge to 
expound the law only … not to speculate upon what is the best, in his 
opinion, for the advantage of the community. [W]e are not … authorised 
to establish as law everything which we may think for the public good, 
and prohibit everything which we think otherwise.38 
 
However, the view of the majority of the judges was dismissed. Instead, the 
House of Lords endorsed the view of Lord Chief Baron Pollock who offered an 
account of public policy that amounted to an open-ended principle of law, 
according judges wide discretion to decide any new case that may arise on the 
basis of what they might consider to be good for the “public welfare”. As he 
noted, judges may not be in a better position than other members of the 
community to ascertain what is good for the public, but that would not be a 
valid reason for a judge to refuse to decide upon such a question on the basis 
of general principles derived from former decisions.39  
 
Accordingly, the majority of the Lords held that the condition stipulated by the 
Earl of Bridgewater, although lawful, was against public policy because it had 
the “tendency” to cause Lord Alford to possibly use unlawful and corrupt 
means to secure the title of the Duke or Marquis of Bridgewater for the Earl.  
 
However, Egerton notwithstanding, judges in the late nineteenth century 
remained doubtful and increasingly sceptical of a fluid concept of public 
policy, which was akin to political expedience.40 Unlike the Lords in Egerton, 
English judges appeared to feel uncomfortable with the idea that a “tendency”, 
rather than the terms of the contract itself, could, if found to be harmful to the 
public in general, render an otherwise valid contract unenforceable.41 
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iii. The twentieth century 
 
a. Reservation against an open-ended concept of public policy 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the reservation against an open-
ended concept of public policy had become the primary consideration for 
English judges who confirmed in a number of cases that judicial function 
required them to interpret existing legal rules and precedent rather than 
expound on, or invent new heads of, public policy.42 Approaching the doctrine 
of public policy cautiously, English judges were mindful not to invalidate 
contracts which may be considered in the views of individual judges as 
generally “repugnant to the interests of the State” or phrases to that effect even 
in the context of exceptional circumstances such as war. In Janson v Driefontein 
Consolidated Mines [1902], a South African company insured a large amount of 
gold with Lloyd’s against capture during its transit from South Africa to 
England. The government of South Africa eventually seized the treasure 
during the transit and war was later declared between South Africa and Great 
Britain. At the end of the war the South African company brought a claim 
against Lloyd’s to recover the amount due under the policy. The House of 
Lords rejected Lloyd’s position that the insurance policy was against public 
policy on the basis that a contract with a foreign company of a State, which 
subsequently becomes an enemy, is injurious to the public interest and the 
interests of Britain. As Halsbury LC noted, a statement that declares a contract 
against public policy is not in and of itself a valid statement in a court of law.43 
A contract cannot be invalid because, in the views of a judge, it is against public 
policy, but because it is against a legal rule or a principle of public policy which 
prohibits certain classes of contracts, for example, contracts in restraint of 
trade.44   
 
Similar considerations guided judicial function in non-commercial disputes 
implicating circumstances that were (at least at the time) socially sensitive, 
where one might have thought that public policy would have played a more 
prominent role. Thus, for example, in Bowman v Secular Society [1917],45 it was 
held that the registration of a secular society as a company with the main object 
to promote the belief that human conduct should be based upon natural 
knowledge rather than supernatural beliefs was not contravening English 
																																																								
42 See for example Elliman v Carrington [1901] 2 Ch 279, Wallace, Re, Champion v Wallace [1920] 2 
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public policy on the basis that it undermined Christianity, as the plaintiff had 
suggested. For Lord Buckmaster, an offence against Christianity, to the extent 
that such offences were recognised by the law of the time, were either statutory 
or criminal offences at common law.46 He was thus unable to see how an 
offence against Christianity existed at all on the basis of being against the 
general notion of public policy, without being the subject of prosecution.47  
 
Equally, in Fender v Mildmay [1938],48 the House of Lords, overturning the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, held that a promise made by a spouse to marry 
a third person after his marriage was dissolved was not void as against public 
policy. Lord Atkins noted that the whole notion that a contract (or in that case 
a promise) should be rendered void on the basis that it generally presents a 
danger to the public interest was fanciful and unreal.49  
 
b. A more structured doctrine 
Overall, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of public 
policy in English law has evolved away from the generalisations of the earlier 
years into a more structured doctrine of exceptional character.50 While there 
have been dissenting opinions expressing the view that judges should be able 
to take judicial notice of public policy circumstances which lie outside the law,51 
English courts in the last century have largely taken a restrictive approach to 
public policy and the scope of judicial function entailed therein. This can be 
summarised in four propositions: first, public policy is not a general legal 
principle that pervades English law; rather, it is confined to certain fields of 
law, where the public policy prohibition is typically expressed in the form of a 
legal rule. Second, it would be inappropriate for an English judge to render an 
otherwise valid contract void on the basis that this contract is considered to be 
injurious to the interests of the public or any similar reasoning to that effect.52 
A contract can be refused enforcement as being against public policy in 
exceptional circumstances and only if it violates certain policies of fundamental 
significance that have, importantly, been crystallised into statutory or common 
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48 Fender v Mildmay (n 15). 
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50 cf Lord Atkinson in Rodriguez v Speyer (n 15) at 89: “The principles of public policy so adopted 
have, as numerous authorities conclusively show, crystallised, as it were, into strict and rigid 
rules of law to be applied, to use Lord Stowell’s words, ‘with rigour’.” 
51 Rodriguez v Speyer (n 15) at 79 (Lord Haldane) in the minority: “There are many things of 
which the judges are bound to take judicial notice which lie outside the law properly so called, 
and among those things are what is called public policy and the changes which take place in it. 
The law itself may become modified by this obligation of the judges.” 
52 As Lord Atkin noted in Fender v Mildmay (n 15) 12. 
	 11	
law rules. Third, it would be inappropriate for an English judge to disregard a 
legal rule of public policy because the judge disapproves of the policies 
underlying that rule. Fourth, it would be inappropriate for an English judge to 
introduce a new rule of public policy on the basis of what the judge believes 
would be the most appropriate policies to pursue for the benefit of the public.53  
 
c. Judicial discretion 
The above propositions should not be taken to suggest that the doctrine of 
public policy allows no room for discretion. In applying public policy, English 
judges have always enjoyed a certain degree of discretion in two circumstances 
in particular.  
 
In the first place, judges enjoy a limited degree of discretion when a dispute 
gives rise to a novel legal issue. In such a circumstance (nowadays rare), public 
policy operates as a general legal principle rather than a fixed rule. In this type 
of “hard case”, where neither statute nor precedent offers a crystallised rule of 
public policy, judges can address a novel legal question, by bringing moral, 
social and political perspectives into legal reasoning.54 
 
However, even in addressing novel situations, judicial discretion is not 
unfettered. 55  The decision on the novel question must be consistent with 
existing rules and principles of public policy.56 Even deciding hard cases on 
public policy, judges are not free to create a new rule of law, or come up with 
novel legal policies, or substitute their preferred policies for the existing 
policies of the law. Considerations of coherence and consistency play an 
important role in constraining judicial creativity.57 
 
Bell has argued that, in novel situations, public policy can be used as a 
justification for introducing new rules of law, and cites the example of Gray v 
Barr58 to that effect. In Gray, Mr Barr armed with a loaded shotgun went to Mr 
Gray’s house looking for his wife, who had been having an affair with Mr Gray. 
Mr Barr’s gun went off in a struggle and killed Mr Gray, whose father and 
widow subsequently claimed damages against Mr Barr for unlawfully causing 
Mr Gray’s death. Mr Barr claimed an indemnity from insurers under a “hearth 
and home” policy, which provided for indemnification against damages which 
																																																								
53 Rodriguez v Speyer (n 15) 59. 
54  See typically Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale UP 1921) and 
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55 Even Realists admit constraints in judges’ discretion in hard cases. See Llewellyn ibid 53. 
56 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon 1978) ch 5. 
57 Bell (n 4) 228. 
58 Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 (CA). 
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Mr Barr would be liable to pay in respect of bodily injury to a third person. 
While there was neither any contractual provision in the policy nor any settled 
public policy rule that would prevent an insured from claiming from his 
insurance policy in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that Mr 
Barr’s claim was barred by public policy. However, the Court of Appeal did 
not introduce a new rule on the basis of a new policy; it simply extended 
existing rules and confirmed policies existing in the field of motor 
manslaughter to address the novel situation where a man who accidentally 
killed his wife’s lover attempts to recover from his insurance policy. As Lord 
Denning MR held, in the case of a motor manslaughter the insured is entitled 
to recover damages caused by his conduct unless his conduct is wilful and 
culpable.59 Employing the concept of public policy, he then applied this legal 
rule to find that Mr Barr was not allowed to recover indemnity for the bodily 
injury which Mr Barr wilfully and culpably caused. 60  To arrive at this 
conclusion Lord Denning did not introduce a new policy or a new rule. He 
meticulously identified existing common law rules and principles citing 
previous cases in the area of motor manslaughter.61  
 
In the second place, judges enjoy a degree of discretion when they are called to 
decide on competing public interests in certain areas of social and economic 
activity. In these circumstances, the common law has developed public policy 
rules whose application is predicated upon flexible tests which allow judges to 
take account of broader considerations in deciding whether a contract is against 
public policy.  
 
This is, for example, the case in the field of restraint of trade. Restraint of trade 
agreements require judges to resolve the tension between the right of a 
professional association and an employer to lay down rules for its members 
and employees on the one hand, and the interests of the public, including those 
of the individual members and employees, that all persons exercise their trade 
freely on the other hand. To resolve the tension, common law rules have 
developed a public policy rule, exemplified in Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt 
Guns and Ammunition, 62 that an agreement that purports to restrain trade and 
interfere with individual liberty of action is void unless “it is reasonable in 
reference to the interest of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to 
the interests of the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate 
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protection to the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it 
is in no way injurious to the public”.63  
 
d. A balancing exercise  
Such a widely formulated test on the basis of reasonableness requires English 
courts to perform a balancing exercise, which entails engagement with broader 
considerations concerning the interests of the public and the appropriate 
boundaries on individual liberty of action. While such a balancing exercise 
necessarily involves the court in value judgements in the light of the public 
interest, 64 the decision on whether a restraint of trade is against public policy 
will be taken on the basis of existing policies of the law as these are captured 
by statutory law and common law principles. Specifically, the fact that 
individual rights and liberty of action, including freedom of contract, are 
presently recognised as important organisational principles of our society and 
as the primary means of achieving collective prosperity must be taken as the 
basis of a judge’s decision in balancing between the competing interests in a 
restraint of trade situation.65 It would be inappropriate for the courts to engage 
in a broad debate about competing theories of political economy and about 
whether liberty of trade is a worthy protected policy.66 While the courts have 
on a number of occasions acknowledged, mainly as a fait accompli, economic 
and social changes that have occurred in our society, 67  they are not the 
appropriate forum for resolving debates on social or economic policy.68As 
Ungoed-Thomas J noted in Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd69: 
[T]he question which such reasonableness raises would thus not be 
whether the restraint might be less in a different organisation of industry 
or society, or whether the abolition of the restraint might lead to a 
different organisation of industry or society and thus, on balance of 
many considerations, to the economic or social advantage of the 
country, but whether the restraint is, in our industry and society as at 
present organised and with reference to which our law operates, 
unreasonable in the public interest as recognised and formulated in such 
principle or proposition of law.70 
 
																																																								
63 ibid (Lord Macnaghten). 
64 Bell (n 4) 183. 
65 ibid. 
66 cf Lord Finlay in Crown Milling Co v R [1927] AC 394, stating that it is not part of the court’s 
function to express views on economic theories. 
67 Such as the recognition of the unequal bargaining position of an employee vis-à-vis his 
employer as accepted in Mason v Provident Supply Co [1913] AC 724. See Lloyd (n 6) 138. 
68 ibid. 
69 Texaco Ltd v Mulberry Filling Station Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 814. 
70 ibid 828. 
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While originally Ungoed-Thomas’s approach was the subject of criticism on the 
basis that it subsumes interests of the public into the interests of the parties,71 
it is now acknowledged that his views are supported by sound arguments of 
policy in that courts are not the appropriate forum for assessing economic 
evidence and balancing the interests of conflicting groups in a society.72  
  
In conclusion, over the course of the last century in particular, clear doctrinal 
limitations have been placed upon the concept of public policy and associated 
judicial function. As a result, the modern concept of the doctrine comprises 
mostly rules and some limited value judgements. 73  Judges have generally 
limited discretion when applying the rules of public policy, except in the two 
circumstances discussed above, namely when they address a novel situation 
and when applying rules that are predicated on a flexible test which allows 
them to mediate considerations of public policy through more open questions 
such as what is reasonable or not.74 While the overall rigidity of the doctrine 
leaves scope for harsh results,75 which often make the courts reluctant to apply 
it,76 it has always seemed consistent with the general approach of English law 
which has largely opposed discretion, particularly in the area of contract law.77 
The limited scope of the doctrine appears also consonant with the general 
aversion of common lawyers to the use of inherently subjective notions, such 
as the notion of public morality or the interests of justice and the generally 
recognised predilection of the common law for objective standards,78 especially 
for the purposes of invalidating otherwise valid agreements.  
 
By contrast, continental civil laws typically enshrine the concept of morality in 
statutory provisions, which allows civil law judges to invalidate contracts if 
they contravene good morals. Importantly, because the provisions of the civil 
codes relating to good morals contain no exposition of the meaning of the term 
and because civil law systems generally lack a doctrine of binding precedent, 
civil law judges enjoy wide discretion in expounding rules of morality. 79 
																																																								
71 John D Heydon, “Recent Developments in Restraint of Trade” (1975) 21 McGill LJ 325. 
72 Hugh Beale, Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed, Wildy 2015) 16-106. 
73 Jonathan Mance, “Ex turpi causa – when Latin avoids liability” (2014) Edin LR 176. 
74 ibid. 
75 See Shand (n 6) 165. 
76 cf Lord Sumption in Apotex admitting that “The main reason for the disordered state of the 
case law is the distaste of the courts for the consequences of applying their own rules, 
consequences which Lord Mansfield CJ had pointed out two centuries ago” in Les Laboratoires 
Servier v Apotex [2012] EWCA Civ 593; [2013] Bus. L.R. 80. 
77 Mance (n 73) 192. 
78 Lloyd (n 6) 150. 
79 Lloyd (n 6) 5; morals are enshrined, for example in art 6 of the French Civil Code, which 
provides that “statutes relating to public policy and morals may not be derogated from by 
private agreements” and art 1133, “A cause is unlawful where it is prohibited by legislation, 
where it is contrary to public morals or to public policy.” 
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Indeed, French courts are permitted to render void any agreement which they 
consider is against morality or public order even if this agreement is not 
contrary to the law.80 As Lloyd has noted, the fundamental difference in the 
judicial function under public policy allows a civil law judge “to decide the 
issue before him, if not more light-heartedly, at least in a rather more 
experimental frame of mind than that of a common law judge”.81 
 
While moral considerations have often been used by common law as a 
justification for the development of a public policy rule, for example the rule 
against illegality, morality or justice, they are neither enshrined in the public 
policy rule itself nor used as a general test for the application of a public policy 
rule.  
e. The importance of the English doctrine of public policy on international 
arbitration 
Examining the public policy doctrine in England matters not only for English 
law but also for the field of international arbitration, with the appropriate scope 
of judicial function under English public policy being the subject of a number 
important international arbitral awards. For example, in the World Duty Free Co. 
Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya decided by an investment treaty tribunal under the 
rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICDIS), 
the investor, World Duty Free, initiated ICSID arbitration against the Republic 
of Kenya for breach of the contract in 2004. Kenya argued that that the contract, 
which was governed by English law, had been procured by the payment of a 
US$2m bribe and was, consequently, voidable. The investor claimed that its 
claim should not be dismissed on the grounds of illegality on the basis that, 
inter alia, public policy considerations prohibited Kenya to profit from its own 
illegalities, namely from enjoying benefit of its contractual bargain despite its 
role in the illegal activity underlying the transaction. 
 
However, the tribunal found that the application of a English public policy rule 
is not amenable to equitable corrections. While it acknowledged that the 
claimant had been solicited to offer a bribe by the Kenyan President himself, 
and that for that reason the claimant was possibly justified to “feel strongly the 
unfairness of the legal case now advanced by Kenya,”82 the tribunal noted that “as 
regards public policy … the law protects not the litigating parties but the public; or in 
this case, the mass of tax-payers and other citizens making up one of the poorest 
countries in the world.”83 
 
																																																								
80 Lloyd (n 6) 117. 
81 ibid 119. 
82 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, para.180. 
83 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, para. 181. 
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The same approach was taken by another investment treaty tribunal in the 
Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, which dismissed the claimant’s claims 
on the grounds that the contract under which the claims were made was 
procured by bribery. While the tribunal acknowledged that the outcome in 
cases of corruption often appear to challenge perceptions of fairness and justice, 
it pointed out that the main justification of the public policy defence is to 
promote “the rule of law” rather than “to punish one party at the cost of the other”.84   
 
 
However, as the following section will explain, the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Patel v Mizra not only has changed the nature of the inquiry in 
relation to the rule on illegality, but appears to radically depart from generally 
accepted, indeed settled, propositions on the nature of the public policy and 
associated judicial function under English law.   
 
3. The latest approach to public policy and judicial function in English Law 
 
i. The rule on illegality 
While  Mirza concerns a subset of the public policy doctrine, namely the public 
policy rule on illegality, the Supreme Court’s ruling may potentially have 
broader ramifications on the doctrine of public policy and associated judicial 
function. To appreciate the Supreme Court’s decision on Mirza, it is necessary 
to look first into the illegality rule and its development until 2016.  
 
The rule on illegality has been traditionally underpinned by clear public policy 
justifications originating from the Latin maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.85  
 
Over the years, English courts distilled the originally abstract content of the ex 
turpi causa principle into a rule, which mainly operated as a procedural defence, 
preventing a claimant from recovering when the claimant’s cause of action 
(either contractual or in tort) was founded on illegality.86  
																																																								
84See Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, para. 389: “While 
reaching the conclusion that the claims are barred as a result of corruption, the Tribunal is 
sensitive to the ongoing debate that findings on corruption often come down heavily on 
claimants, while possibly exonerating defendants that may have themselves been involved in 
the corrupt acts. It is true that the outcome in cases of corruption often appears unsatisfactory 
because, at first sight at least, it seems to give an unfair advantage to the defendant party. The 
idea, however, is not to punish one party at the cost of the other, but rather to ensure the 
promotion of the rule of law, which entails that a court or tribunal cannot grant assistance to a 
party that has engaged in a corrupt act”. 
85 See Lord Mansfield’s well-known dictum in Holman v Johnson [1775] 1 Cowp 341, 343: “The 
principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man 
who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.” 
86 Strauss (n 8) 236.  
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In contracts, the main test which English courts used to determine when a 
claimant’s cause of action was “founded on illegality” was the test of reliance. 
According to the reliance test, which was based on the eighteenth-century 
authority in Holman v Johnson87 and was affirmed by the House of Lords at the 
end of the twentieth century in Tinsley v Milligan,88 the illegality defence will 
prevent a claimant from recovering if the claimant needs to plead or lead evidence 
of illegality in order to establish her claim in the first place.89  
 
In tort, where the test of reliance was not always able to capture the illegal 
situation, English courts had to develop different tests. For example, the Court 
of Appeal introduced in Cross v Kirkby the inextricable test, whereby if a 
“claimant’s claim is so closely or inextricably bound up with his own criminal 
or illegal conduct … the court could not permit him to recover without 
appearing to condone the conduct”.90 After the House of Lords decision in Gray 
v Thames Trains, 91  two versions of the illegality defence in tort have been 
articulated92: under the narrow version a claimant cannot recover any damage 
which is the consequence of a sentence imposed upon the claimant for a 
criminal or unlawful act, while under the wide version the claimant cannot 
recover for any damage which is the consequence of the claimant’s own 
criminal or unlawful act whether or not convicted of a criminal offence.  
 
While the tests employed by English courts to determine the illegality rule 
varied, depending on the type of claim, the scope of judicial function remained 
consistent with the evolution of the public policy doctrine as a set of rules 
whose application was mandatory irrespective of broader considerations of 
fairness. Indeed, while the rule on illegality was criticised as inflexible and 
often unjust, 93  it left no room for English judges to exercise any sort of 
discretion by taking account of the perceived injustices of each case. Any 
attempt in the course of the twentieth century to rationalise the rule and 
transform it into a mere power was firmly rejected by the House of Lords 
originally and subsequently by the Supreme Court in 2016. 
 
The most notable of these attempts was made by a number of first instance and 
Court of Appeal decisions in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the decision in 
Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst introduced the “public conscience” test whereby the 
																																																								
87 Holman v Johnson (n 85) 341, 343. 
88 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 (HL).  
89 See Strauss (n 7) 243. 
90 Cross v Kirkby [2000] EWCA Civ 426 (per Beldam LJ). 
91 Gray v Thames Trains [2009] UKHL 33. 
92 Rachael Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law (CUP 2016) ch 10. 
93 See Shand (n 6) 165. 
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illegality defence would apply when, “in all the circumstances it would be an 
affront to the public conscience” to allow the claimant to recover.94 Thus, under 
the public conscience test, a decision on the illegality defence was essentially a 
value judgement which would be taken on the basis of a range of circumstances 
surrounding the claim, including the significance of the illegality and the 
injustice of barring the claimant’s claim due to such illegality.95 
 
The Court of Appeal took the same approach in Tinsley v Milligan, where the 
claimant and the defendant bought a house with jointly owned funds but 
registered it in the sole name of the claimant so that the defendant could 
fraudulently claim social security benefits. After the defendant repented and 
confessed to the benefit fraud, the two parties quarrelled and the claimant 
claimed ownership and possession of the whole house. The defendant filed a 
counterclaim for a declaration of co-ownership of the house, on the basis that 
the property was held by the claimant on trust for the parties in equal shares. 
The claimant invoked the illegality defence, arguing that the defendant could 
not rely on an arrangement which had an unlawful purpose.  
 
Holding that it would be an affront to the public conscience not to grant the 
defendant her counterclaim, Nicholls LJ took a discretionary approach to 
illegality on the basis of a balancing exercise. Specifically, he held that in 
deciding whether to accept the illegality defence put forward by the claimant, 
the court had to “weight or balance” the “powerful case” for not aiding the 
defendant who had enjoyed fraudulent benefit claims against depriving her of 
her property in favour of the equally fraudulent claimant, and the fact that the 
defendant had repented of the frauds and had informed the Department of 
Social Security of the fraud.96 As Nicholls LJ noted, “the ultimate decision [in 
this case] calls for a value judgment”.97  
 
However, while it rejected the claimant’s illegality defence under the reliance 
test on the grounds that the defendant was able to successfully claim her title 
to the property because she relied on her contribution to the purchase of the 
property rather than on the fraudulent agreement, the House of Lords 
unanimously rejected the public conscience test. As the House of Lords 
confirmed, the public policy rule on illegality is not a principle of justice, but a 
principle of policy, whose application has to be indiscriminate.98 Rejecting the 
public conscience test, Lord Goff noted that its adoption “would constitute a 
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95 ibid.  
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revolution in this branch of the law, under which what is in effect a discretion 
would become vested in the court to deal with the matter by the process of a 
balancing operation, in place of a system of rules”.99 
 
Two decades later, the Court of Appeal in Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex 100 
made another attempt to transform the ex turpi causa rule into a discretionary 
principle, by introducing a proportionality test. It is worth noting that in the 
meantime, the Law Commission had issued two Consultation Papers101 and 
one Report102 on the illegality defence, strongly arguing against the operation 
of the illegality defence as a rule of law. Instead, the Law Commission 
recommended that the illegality defence be allowed where its application could 
be firmly justified by one or more justifying policies, such as deterrence or the 
policy of maintaining the integrity of the legal system or the policy that the 
claimant should not profit from her own wrong.  
 
Broadly drawing on the Law Commission’s recommendations, Etherton LJ 
who gave the judgment at the Court of Appeal in Apotex stated that in deciding 
the illegality defence a court had to “take into account a wide range of 
considerations in order to ensure that the defence only applies where it is a just 
and proportionate response to the illegality involved in the light of the policy 
considerations underlying it”.103 
 
However, on appeal, the Supreme Court in Apotex rejected Etherton’s 
proportionality approach to the illegality defence. While the Supreme Court 
had held in Hounga v Allen104 (just a few months before its decision in Apotex) 
that the harsh consequences of the illegality defence may sometimes be avoided 
by applying “another more important public policy”,105 Lord Sumption, who 
gave the leading speech in Apotex,106 rejected any suggestion that the ex turpi 
causa rule can be a flexible principle allowing for considerations of justice. Lord 
Sumption observed that the Law Commission’s recommendations were 
directly inconsistent with previous binding authority and made “the law 
																																																								
99 ibid 363. 
100 Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex (n 76). 
101 Consultation Paper No 160, “The Illegality Defence in Tort” (2001) and Consultation Paper 
No 189, “The Illegality Defence: A Consultative Report” (2009). 
102 Law Commission Report No 320, “The Illegality Defence” (2010). 
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105 See also Strauss (n 7) 262. 
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uncertain by inviting the courts to depart from existing rules of law in 
circumstances where it is difficult for them to acknowledge openly what they 
are doing or to substitute a coherent alternative structure”.107 Lord Sumption 
noted that what matters for the purpose of the illegality defence is whether a 
turpitude existed and what the relationship between the turpitude and the 
claim is, not how badly the parties behaved in the case before the courts. 
Criticising the Court of Appeal’s decision, he went on to state that although 
“the doctrine necessarily operates harshly in some cases”, it is a legal rule 
which is rooted in public policy, not a mere discretionary power to be 
determined on the basis of the perceived balance of merits between the parties 
in a particular dispute.108 
 
Despite the unequivocal confirmation of the illegality rule in Apotex, four years 
later, in July 2016, the Supreme Court (in plenary session) issued its decision in 
Patel v Mirza which marks a clear, if controversial, departure from long-
standing authority stretching 200 years back to Holman v Johnson. It is worth 
looking more closely into the Mirza case not only because it is the most recent 
Supreme Court decision on the illegality defence, but because it is a ruling with 
potentially significant implications for the doctrine of public policy in English 
law more generally. 
 
ii. Patel v Mirza 
The factual circumstances of the case are relatively straightforward. Patel 
transferred sums of money to Mirza to bet on the price of Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) shares using advance insider information which Mirza 
anticipated obtaining from RBS contacts. Mirza’s expectation did not 
materialise and eventually the betting did not take place. When Patel brought 
a claim against Mirza to recover the sums he had originally paid to him, Mirza 
relied on the illegality defence contending that allowing Patel to recover from 
a contract which was concluded by an illegal act, namely conspiracy to commit 
insider dealing, would be against English public policy.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that under the reliance test, Mirza’s defence did not 
succeed because the illegal scheme was not eventually executed. At the 
Supreme Court, all justices agreed with the Court of Appeal that Patel should 
be able to recover the money paid to Mirza under the illegal but unexecuted 
contract. However, the nine justices were divided in their reasoning, notably 
on whether the illegality defence should function as a legal rule or a flexible set 
of policies.  
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The leading judgment for the majority decision was given by Lord Toulson, 
with whom Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge and Lord 
Neuberger agreed, although the President of the Supreme Court appeared to 
be sceptical about some of the reasons offered by Lord Toulson. Lord Mance, 
Lord Clare and Lord Sumption dissented on very similar grounds. The 
majority decision in Mirza rejected the reliance test in Tinsley and substituted it 
with a broader inquiry as to whether enforcement of a claim would be harmful 
to the public interest. According to Lord Toulson this inquiry was to be decided 
by considering a range of factors, including, first, the underlying purpose of 
the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be 
enhanced by denial of the claim; second, any other relevant public policy on 
which the denial of the claim may have an impact; and third, whether denial of 
the claim would be a proportionate response to the illegality, bearing in mind 
that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts.109 
 
The reasoning of the SC majority decision to substitute the rule of illegality with 
a range-of-policy factors was based on the well-known criticism against ex turpi 
causa. Specifically, Lord Toulson described the effects that the rule of illegality 
has on the parties’ contractual rights as “very unclear”,110 and noted that the 
test of reliance has led to problems of arbitrariness, uncertainty and potential 
injustice.111 
 
It is hard to disagree with Lord Toulson’s assessment of the reliance test. Its 
application has often been problematic in that it is effectively an artificial 
procedural test which allowed claimants to frame their claims creatively to 
avoid reliance on the underlying illegality. However, whether a radical shift 
from a rule-based to a range-of-factors approach was the right response to the 
problems associated with the application of the reliance test is questionable. 
 
Indeed, it is submitted that Mirza’s fundamental change in judicial attitude to 
public policy and illegality is unlikely to result in the required analytical 
coherence and legal certainty in this important area of English law. More 
importantly for the purposes of this article, it is further submitted that the Mirza 
ruling represents an unnecessary, and indeed unwarranted, departure from 
generally accepted principles on the doctrine of public policy and associated 
judicial function under English law, for the following reasons.    
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In the first place, the public policy inquiry introduced in Mirza is based on an 
open-ended list of factors which will lead to potentially considerable legal 
uncertainty. Lord Toulson’s suggested list of factors and proportionality tests 
open up the inquiry to a wide range of public policies and considerations which 
in the views of a judge may be relevant to deny the enforcement of the claim. 
For example, the Law Commission’s Report (2010)112 and Professor Burrows’ 
Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment,113 on whose work Lord 
Toulson relied heavily in his decision, identify a long list of policies and 
considerations which may become relevant to a public policy inquiry, 
including consistency; the need to prevent the claimant from profiting from his 
or her own wrong; deterrence; maintaining the integrity of the legal system; 
punishment; the degree of illegality of the conduct; whether the party seeking 
enforcement knew of, or intended, the conduct; how central to the contract or 
its performance the conduct was; how serious a sanction the denial of 
enforcement is for the party seeking enforcement. 
 
Lord Toulson arrestingly admitted that it was not possible to lay down a 
prescriptive or definitive list of relevant factors “because of the infinite possible 
variety of cases”.114 While inflexibility might have occasionally led to harsh 
outcomes under the rule-based approach, such an open-ended inquiry is likely 
to result in inconsistent and possibly contested policy justifications of public 
policy decisions in the future. Importantly too, it is against the typical approach 
of English courts which, as shown in the first part of this article, have taken a 
largely restrictive approach to public policy inquiries in the last century. 
 
In the second place, the nature of the suggested factors set out by Lord Toulson, 
the Law Commission’s Report and Professor Burrows invites courts to engage 
in moral and highly subjective evaluations. As Lord Sumption observed, the 
proportionality factor entails the risk that each judge will have to decide how 
illegal the illegality was or how much illegality matters. 115  Crucially, the 
majority opinion in Mirza offers no standards or tests to guide judicial attitude 
in deciding questions on public policy. Thus, under the range-of-factors 
approach, the inquiry as to whether English courts should enforce an illegal or 
immoral contract is akin to a discretion, and judicial function is turned to a 
value judgement which Lord Mance warned might be conducted in “a highly 
unspecific non-legal sense”.116 
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However, inviting judges to exercise their discretion and make a value 
judgement without any guiding test or standard runs contrary to the way 
English judges typically exercise judicial function. As was shown in the first 
part of this article, under the modern doctrine of public policy, English judges 
could refuse enforcement of a claim as being against public policy only if the 
claim violated policies which were already crystallised into statutory or 
common law rules. An English judge had no discretion to introduce a new rule 
of public policy on the basis of what the judge believed would benefit the public 
interest. Exercising their discretion to decide whether a claim will be denied on 
the basis of whether the denial of the claim would be a proportionate response 
to the illegality and whether another policy, unspecified in advance, may be 
impacted, English judges will effectively introduce a new rule on public policy 
each time.  
 
As was explained in the first part of this article, in applying public policy 
English judges have some degree of discretion in circumstances when, first, a 
dispute gives rise to a novel issue, and second, the application of a public policy 
rule is predicated on a more flexible test, such as the test of reasonableness in a 
dispute relating to restraint of trade. However, even in those circumstances 
judges are not permitted to engage in broad discussions about the public 
interest or about considerations of morality and justice. Under the doctrine of 
public policy as this evolved in the last century, judges are not free to arrive at 
new policies and new public policy justifications to support their decision. 
Even in deciding a novel situation, judicial discretion is constrained or at least 
guided by existing tests and principles of public policy. Crucially, the ex turpi 
causa rule is not a novel situation. It is a well-known legal question which has 
been addressed for centuries by a crystallised rule of law. By substituting the 
rule on illegality with a range of factors, the Mirza ruling effectively turns all 
cases on illegality into “hard” cases whose outcome will depend on value 
judgements including considerations of justice. As was demonstrated in the 
first part of this article, morality and justice were traditionally neither 
enshrined in the public policy doctrine itself nor used as a general test for its 
application.   
 
In the third place, the range-of-factors approach introduces a discretionary and 
highly subjective approach to decision making which may eventually place the 
fundamental public policy behind the rule of illegality in jeopardy (well settled 
in English law since Holman v Johnson), namely that it would be inappropriate 
for the system of justice to appear to assist in the enforcement of an illegal or 
immoral contract.117   
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The straightforward, if inflexible, nature of the central public policy behind the 
illegality rule made the rule powerful and commanding. Whether the dismissal 
of the claim, arising out of an illegal or immoral contract, might confer an 
advantage on the defendant, who may also be implicated in the underlying 
illegality, was an unappealing prospect but eventually an acceptable 
implication of the implementation of the rule.118  
 
Admittedly, the circumstances of different cases had occasionally affected the 
application of the rule on illegality and had given rise to inconsistent 
outcomes.119 For example, in Holman, Lord Mansfield held that the plaintiff’s 
knowledge of the immoral cause of the contract did not affect the plaintiff’s 
ability to recover from it, since he was not himself involved in the immorality. 
By contrast, in Pearce v Brooks,120 a claim against a prostitute to recover money 
from the hire was held to be unenforceable on the basis that the plaintiff had 
knowledge of the illegality of the transaction. While Lord Denning later 
attempted to reconcile the two cases in JM Allan (Merchandising) Ltd v Cloke,121 
by introducing a distinction to the effect that “active participation debars, but 
knowledge by itself does not”, his approach was theoretically rational but 
effectively artificial and eventually difficult to apply with consistency in 
practice. 
 
However, these kinds of problems with the application of the rule, which 
occasionally led to the defeat of the underlying public policy, were seen as an 
unwelcome aberration of the rule-based approach. By contrast, under the 
range-of-factors approach, defeat of the central public policy against the 
enforcement of illegal and corrupt agreements comes as an acceptable outcome, 
if a judge decides that other policies, which are introduced as part of the 
balancing exercise, should prevail over the public policy against illegality.  
 
Indeed, under the new approach the focus of the public policy inquiry is not on 
whether a contract is tainted by illegality; rather, it is on whether the claimant 
should recover or not on the basis of broader considerations reflected in a 
number of policies, including considerations of justice.122 This approach raises 
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and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant was to bring his action against the 
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two issues. First, it is again contrary to the way English judges exercised their 
judicial function in public policy inquiries. As the first part of this article has 
shown, while moral considerations were used by common law as an 
underlying justification of public policy rule, morality and justice were neither 
enshrined in the public policy inquiry itself nor used as a general test for the 
application of a public policy rule. Second, and possibly more significantly, by 
making the question of illegality only one factor of a broader value judgement 
and, importantly, by shifting the focus of analysis from illegality to recovery, 
the proposed range-of-factors test analytically disconnects the inquiry about 
whether a claim rooted in illegality should be enforced from the public policy 
against bribery and corruption.123   
 
It has been observed that the historical context within which the public policy 
behind illegality was originally formulated has changed as regulation has been 
rapidly expanded in the last few decades. 124  As a result, it is argued, the 
underlying policy in Holman is too extreme and inflexible to represent a sound 
legal policy in today’s society.125 But while regulation to address bribery and 
corruption indeed intensified at an international level in the course of the 
twentieth century, corruption is still pervasive worldwide.126 Notably, England 
recently hosted an anti-corruption summit in London, with the then Prime 
Minister signalling the government’s intention to intensify the battle against 
corruption in the United Kingdom and overseas. 127  To that effect, the UK 
introduced new measures in the Bribery Act 2010 and the Criminal Finance Bill 
2016 with the aim, inter alia, of depriving the corrupt of obtaining the benefit 
of their crimes.  
 
It is thus questionable whether contextualising the public policy inquiry and 
introducing only a “proportionate” response to illegal or corrupt contracts are 
either appropriate or indeed desirable.  
 
In any case, in the absence of statutory power, English courts lack the power to 
heavily qualify the public policy against illegality by introducing a new 
approach to judicial function which invites judges to mediate between a 
number of competing interests and policies implicated in the inquiry about 
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126  See Corruption Perceptions INDEX 2017 available at < 
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illegality.128 While since the middle of the previous century the House of Lords 
and now the Supreme Court have been free to overrule their previous decisions 
and have shown greater readiness to adapt the common law to new 
conditions,129 the radical departure from consistent authorities of centuries past 
is at odds with the typically incremental manner in which common law 
develops.130 That being so, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mirza borders on 
legislative function.131 
 
 After observing that the ex turpi causa rule could only be modified by statute, 
unless public policy views of commercial morality had clearly come in a 
particular age to doubt that honesty is the best policy, Lord Sumner in 
Rodriguez v Speyer132 went on to note: 
 
If the application of a rule founded on public policy admits of doubt, it 
is legitimate to consider that policy, in order to decide whether the case 
falls within the public mischief, which the rule purports to prevent, but 
when the rule and its application are perfectly clear and admit of no 
doubt the mischief must be assumed, and the policy needs no inquiry.133  
 
There have been no indications that the public policy behind the rule of 
illegality “admits of doubt”, nor did the majority decision in Mirza suggest so. 
The Law Commission’s work, upon which Lord Toulson’s lead decision in 
Mirza heavily relied, did not suggest that the application of the reliance test 
resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes, which were largely considered to be 
unfair.134 Rather the Law Commission was critical of the way decisions on 
illegality were reached, being occasionally arbitrary, non-transparent and 
potentially only unjust. 135  For all its inflexibility, the rule of illegality had 
mostly worked well and had led courts to arrive at outcomes which were 
generally acceptable. In Tinsley, for example, the respondent was not 
eventually deprived of her right in the property, as the court held that illegality 
of a transaction does not render equitable rights void. Equally, in Mirza, the 
dissenting justices who remained faithful to the rule found that the claimant 
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should be able to recover the money paid to the respondent. 136  It is 
questionable, therefore, whether the fundamental change in the illegality 
inquiry, which the Mirza ruling introduced, was necessary at all. 
 
Reforming the existing public policy rule of illegality to allow for more 
flexibility and to prevent harsh outcomes might have been a sounder course of 
action for the Supreme Court. There is clear merit, for example, in the 
suggestion of Lord Mance and Lord Sumption to accord broader scope to the 
principles of rescission and restitution, which in the context of the illegality 
defence have become particularly restricted by twentieth-century authority.137 
A more effective use of these principles would allow English courts to restore 
the parties to the position they would have been in, had they never entered into 
the illegal contract.138 Importantly, it would have also allowed English courts 
to find that both the claimant and the respondent are in certain circumstances 
prevented from profiting from their own illegality, which was a major 
consideration of Lord Toulson’s leading judgment. There is also merit in the 
views of Lord Mance and Lord Clarke that the power of the court to deny 
recovery on the ground of illegality should be limited to well-defined 
circumstances to compensate for its draconian nature.139 Developing the public 
policy rule on illegality, rather than abolishing it, would have been more 
consistent with the common law tradition of incremental evolution.   
 
While it is too soon to tell how the public policy inquiry on ex turpi causa will 
develop, from the very limited number of cases that have been discussed since 
the Supreme Court ruling in Mirza, it is clear that judicial function has already 
started to change in relation to illegality. Judges, as the leading decision in 
Mirza invited them to do, seemingly feel empowered to make broader 
evaluations about what is unfair, disproportionate and contrary to the public 
interest in deciding a question of public policy.  
 
For example, in Singularis Holdings Ltd v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd,140 a 
company brought an action for the recovery of sums held to its benefit in a 
client account by the defendant stockbroker. The defendant relied on the 
illegality defence on the basis that payments to his account were fraudulently 
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made by the company’s director. Allowing recovery of the payments, the judge 
reasoned, without any explanation or justification, that it “would not be 
contrary to the public interest to allow [the company] to enforce its claim, nor 
would it be harmful to the integrity of the legal system for this claim to 
succeed”.141  
 
In John McHugh v Ophelia Okai-Koi,142 the defendant in criminal proceedings 
was acquitted of causing death by dangerous driving, but convicted of causing 
the death of the wife of the claimant by careless driving while the wife of the 
claimant was on her car bonnet. When the claimant husband sought damages 
in civil proceedings, the defendant relied on the defence of ex turpi causa on the 
grounds that the claimant and his wife, who were highly intoxicated, had 
verbally and physically attacked the defendant at the time of the accident. 
Relying on the Mirza ruling, the judge engaged in a range of subjective 
evaluations such as whether the public interest would be harmed by the denial 
of the claim for damages in circumstances where the defendant had been 
convicted by a jury of causing death by careless driving;143 whether to take 
account of the public policy consideration that the denial of the claim would 
deprive the claimant’s children of damages, as dependants, in circumstances 
for which they were not responsible;144 and whether the denial of the claim 
would be proportionate in circumstances where the defendant had been 
convicted of causing death by careless driving.145  
 
It is evident that these kinds of considerations, which the Mirza ruling 
introduced into the public policy inquiry, blur the distinction between legal 
reasoning and value judgements and allow judges discretion to decide 
important questions of public policy on the basis of subjective opinions. While 
the new approach to public policy and illegality may allow more flexibility, it 
is unlikely that it will achieve less arbitrary outcomes and more analytical 
coherence, the absence of which featured largely in criticism of the illegality 
rule.146  
 
More importantly for the purposes of this article, the Supreme Court decision 
in Mirza invites judges to engage in an open-ended and highly subjective 
inquiry which is contrary to fundamental considerations underpinning the 
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modern doctrine of public policy and associated judicial function, as was 




In conclusion, it is worth summarising the main findings and suggestions of 
the preceding analysis. In the first place, it was shown that since the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the concept of public policy in English law evolved as 
a structured doctrine of exceptional character and restrictive scope. More 
importantly, for the purposes of this article, it was demonstrated that the 
modern doctrine of public policy would not allow judges, first, to take judicial 
notice of public policy circumstances which lie outside the law, notably 
considerations of justice, and, second, to disregard a legal rule of public policy 
because the judge disapproved of the policies underlying that rule. As was 
explained, under the modern concept of public policy, it would not be 
appropriate for an English judge to introduce a new rule of public policy on the 
basis of what the judge believed would be the most appropriate policies to 
pursue for the benefit of the public. 
 
Further, it was demonstrated that, in deciding questions of public policy, 
English judges have generally no or very limited discretion, except in two 
circumstances, namely, when they address a novel situation and when 
applying rules that are predicated on flexible tests which allow them to mediate 
considerations of public policy through more open questions such as what is 
reasonable or not. As was noted, this restrictive approach to judicial function is 
consistent with the general approach of English law which largely opposes 
discretion and value judgements, particularly in the area of contract law.  
 
In the light of the above findings, it was suggested that the SC’s ruling in Mirza 
contravenes a number of traditionally accepted propositions on the 
appropriate judicial function in relation to questions of public policy. 
Specifically, it was suggested that the range-of-factors approach invites English 
judges to engage in open-ended and highly subjective evaluations without the 
benefit of a guiding test or standard. This approach is effectively akin to 
unfettered discretion and turns all questions relating to illegality into hard 
cases, allowing English judges to introduce new rules on public policy in “a 
highly unspecific non-legal sense.” 
 
Finally, it was suggested, that the discretionary and highly subjective approach 
to decision making introduced by Mirza might eventually place the 
fundamental public policy against illegality in jeopardy. It was submitted that, 
by contextualising the inquiry about illegality, the range-of-factors test 
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analytically disconnects the inquiry about whether a claim rooted in illegality 
should be enforced from the public policy against bribery and corruption. 
 
